Should capital income be taxed for redistributional purposes? Judd (1985) suggests that it should not. He nds that the optimal capital tax is zero at steady state from the point of view of any agent. This paper re-examines this question in an innitely-lived worker-capitalist model, in which capitalists devote management time to build capital. Two forms of capital taxation are considered: one for which investment is not tax deductible (corporate tax) and a second one for which investment is fully and immediately tax deductible (dividend tax). Our main results are as follows. The optimal corporate tax is zero at steady state from the point of view of any agent. However, the optimal dividend tax is in general not zero at steady state and depends on preference parameters, life-time wealth and the point of view (Pareto weights) of the benevolent policymaker. For Pareto weights that lead to Pareto-improving reforms, we nd that labor tax rates should be eliminated while dividend tax rates should be increased to around 36 per cent at steady state.
Introduction
Should capital income be taxed for redistributional purposes? The seminal work of Judd (1985) suggests that it should not. He nds that the optimal redistributive tax on capital income is asymptotically zero from the point of view of any agent.
1 Given this result, most of the literature on optimal taxation has focused on the eciency purposes of capital taxation in representative agent models rather than the redistributive side of capital taxation. In practice, however, capital taxes are far from zero. This is illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 1 , where capital tax rates are also shown to vary substantially across countries and with the political turnover.
[Insert Table 1 Recently, in an important contribution to the literature of optimal taxation, Albanesi and Armenter (2012) identify a general optimality principle. Optimal policy should be such that permanent intertemporal distortions are eliminated in the long run. In terms of capital taxation, this general principle can be put into practice in two alternative ways: (i) capital taxes are set to zero, or (ii) investment is fully and immediately tax deductible so that constant capital taxes do not bring in permanent intertemporal distortions. A recent example of this distinction is in Conesa and Domínguez (2013) . In a representative agent model with intangible assets and investment deductibility, we consider two forms of capital taxation: one for which investment is not tax deductible and a second one for which investment is fully and immediately tax deductible.
For clarity of exposition, we refer to them as corporate taxes and dividend taxes respectively. In that paper, we found that, at steady state, while optimal corporate taxes are zero, the optimal tax rate on dividend income is positive, and equal to the optimal labor tax rate. We conjecture that these two dierent ways for capital taxation to attain the same eciency principle must have dierent implications for redistribution. This paper re-examines the optimal redistributive capital tax when investment is tax deductible.
We consider an economic environment that merges those considered in Judd (1985) and Conesa 1 In a representative agent model, Chamley (1986) also nds that steady state capital taxes should be set to zero. This result does not extend to OLG models, as shown in Erosa and Gervais (2002) , Garriga (2017) and Conesa et al. (2009) 
and Domínguez (2013): an innitely-lived worker-capitalist model, in which workers provide raw labor to rms while capitalists can provide management time to build capital and/or raw labor.
Management time is a form of intangible investment. It is sometimes called sweat equity, as it is made of hours invested by managers in their businesses to build equity. We again consider corporate taxes (for which investment is not tax deductive) and dividend taxes (for which investment is tax deductible). In comparison to Judd (1985) , the only distinctive features of our environment are elastic labor supplies, management time and tax deductible investment.
Our main results are as follows. First, as in Judd (1985) , the optimal redistributive corporate tax is zero at steady state from the point of view of any agent. Since investment is not tax deductible in corporate income, corporate taxes create permanent intertemporal distortions and are not optimal for eciency neither for redistribution in the long run. Second, as Conesa and Domínguez (2013) , the optimal dividend tax is not zero at steady state. As investment is fully and immediately tax deductible, a constant dividend tax does not imply any investment distortions and can be set at a positive level for both eciency and redistribution. For eciency purposes, Conesa and Domínguez (2013) nd that dividend taxes should be set at the same level as labor taxes. For redistribution, however, this paper nds that the optimal dividend tax does not need to coincide with the labor tax rate. Moreover, the optimal steady-state dividend tax rate depends on the preference parameters, the life-time wealth of all agents and the point of view (Pareto weights) of the benevolent policymaker.
Our analytical results are illustrated with numerical examples. For our benchmark calibration, and for a policymaker with a very low Pareto weight on workers, the optimal long-run policy sets labor tax rates as high as 90 per cent and dividend tax rates as low as −67 per cent. As the policymaker becomes more pro-worker, optimal steady-state labor taxes decrease and dividend tax rates increase. For Pareto weights consistent with Pareto-improving reforms, we nd that labor taxes are roughly eliminated while dividend taxes are increased to 36 per cent at steady state. For a policymaker that values workers and capitalists equally, the long-run optimal policy prescribes a 14 per cent subsidy to workers and a 69 per cent dividend tax to capitalists. For that and higher Pareto weights, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions on the raw labor supply by capitalists bind at steady state. For that range, as the Pareto weight on workers increases, long-run optimal taxes change only minimally with slight decreases in both labor and dividend tax rates.
Our paper is related to the public nance results on taxation with investment tax deductibility (such as Hall and Jorgenson (1971) and Auerbach (2002) ). More recently, in a general equilibrium framework, Abel (2007) shows that full and immediate investment tax deductibility changes the distortionary properties of capital taxation.
Our work is also related to those of Rogers (1986) and Armenter (2007) . Both study the relationship between credibility (of the optimal policy) and redistribution motives in the setup of Judd (1985) . Armenter (2007) shows that the specic Pareto weights are important for the credibility of an optimal redistributive tax policy. More recently, Bassetto (2014) studies optimal redistributive taxes in an economy with real shocks and no capital. He nds that for extreme values of the Pareto weights, a government may impose large distortions in the economy in order to redistribute wealth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment economy. Section 3 sets the Ramsey problem and develops the main results. Section 4 concludes.
The Model Economy
This Section presents an innite horizon model that merges the frameworks of Judd (1985) and Conesa and Domínguez (2013) .
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, .... Our environment considers a benevolent government and two types of innitely-lived agents: capitalists and workers. Workers (agents of type 1) supply labor to rms but cannot save. Capitalists (agents of type 2) own rms and can save.
In addition, capitalists dedicate management time to the rm in order to build new capital and, if they wish to, they may additionally supply raw labor. Population is normalized to one and is composed of a proportion κ of workers and a proportion (1 − κ) of capitalists.
All workers are assumed to be identical within type. The preferences of each worker are
with the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) , and where the utility function u 1 is strictly increasing (decreasing) in consumption (labor), strictly concave (convex) in consumption (labor), twice continuously dierentiable and, for notational convenience, separable between consumption c 1,t and labor n 1,t .
As workers cannot save or borrow, 2 their budget constraint is given by
in all periods t, where wages are w t and labor income is taxed at the rate τ n t .
Given policies, prices and other agents' choices, workers choose {c 1,t , n 1,t } ∞ t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (2) . The resulting consumption-labor decision is
Partial derivatives of the utility function are denoted with a subscript. Other derivatives follow a similar notation.
All capitalists are assumed to be identical within type. The preferences of each capitalist are
with c 2,t consumption, n 2,t labor, e 2,t eort or management time, and where the utility function u 2 satises the same general properties as u 1 , but may take a dierent specic form. Each capitalist owns a rm that produces a general good using the production function f (k t , n t ) , where k t is capital, n t is the labor employed by the capitalist, and f is increasing, concave and satises the Inada conditions. We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all rms hire the same amount of labor, then n t = κ 1−κ n 1,t + n 2,t . Capitalists can save by investing in their rms and by purchasing government bonds b t+1 . The budget constraint of a capitalist takes the form
where capital income Π t is
where τ k t is a corporate tax with investment x t being not tax deductible, and τ d t is a dividend tax with investment being fully and immediately tax deductible, δ is the capital depreciation rate, and R b t is the return on government bonds in period t.
As mentioned, capitalists devote management time, e 2,t , and resources, x t , to build new capital:
with I strictly increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree 1, continuously dierentiable and satisfying Inada conditions. Equation (7) assumes that management time e 2,t is necessary to transform resources x t into new capital k t . This form nests the standard neoclassical model whenever I (x t , e 2,t ) = x t is assumed for all e 2,t . Conesa and Domínguez (2013) consider two forms of capital, tangible and intangible capital, and dierent technologies for transformation of resources into each form of capital.
Given policies, prices and other agents' choices, a capitalist chooses {c 2,t , n 2,t , e 2,t , x t , n t , k t+1 , b t+1 } ∞ t=0
to maximize (4) subject to (5)- (7), n 2,t ≥ 0, and a no-Ponzi game condition on capital and bonds.
Plugging capital income (6) into the budget constraint (5) and denoting ξ t and ϕ t as the multipliers on (5) and (7) respectively, the rst order conditions for this problem are given by:
and the transversality conditions. Rearranging, the above optimality conditions can be summarized in the labor hiring decision f n,t = w t , a non-arbitrage condition on the return on bonds, and
From the last two conditions, it is easy to see that corporate taxes distort investment while dividend taxes distort the time management decisions and the timing of investment.
The government collects taxes and issues bonds in order to nance an exogenous government consumption, g t > 0, per period and paying debt obligations. Government consumption is unproductive, not valued by households and suciently large so that distortionary taxation is used in equilibrium. The preferences of the benevolent government are given by
with the Pareto weight γ ∈ (0, 1) on workers and (1 − γ) on capitalists. The government's sequen-tial budget constraint is
where capital tax rates are bounded according to τ
Finally, feasibility requires
For a given government policy, the competitive equilibrium of this model economy is characterized by the budget constraint and the optimality condition for the workers, (2)- (3), the budget constraint and optimal conditions for the capitalists, (5)- (10), f n,t = w t , and the non-arbitrage condition on bonds, together with feasibility (12), market clearing and the transversality conditions.
The Optimal Redistributive Policy
This Section considers the optimal redistributive problem of the government at date 0. We assume that the initial after-tax interest rate on bonds R b 0 is given and that there is a commitment technology so that future governments have no incentive to deviate from the optimal policy plan prescribed by the government at 0.
In order to setup the government's problem, we follow the primal approach. The optimality conditions of the agents are substituted in their respective budget constraints to obtain the following implementability conditions u 1c,t c 1,t + u 1n,t n 1,t = 0,
for the worker in each period, and
for the capitalist in its life-time, where
In addition, as labor tax rates are the same across agents, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions on the labor choice of the capitalist require
Moreover, the upper and lower bounds on capital tax rates for each period t ≥ 1 imply
It is easy to verify that the set of feasible allocations that satisfy the implementability conditions (13), (14), (15), and (16) can be decentralized with the available tax rates.
The government's optimization problem is then dened as follows. Given {g t } ∞ t=0 , the government at date 0 chooses the sequences {c 1,t , c 2,t , n 1,t , n 2,t , e 2,t , x t , k t+1 } ∞ t=0 to maximize (11) subject to the resource constraint (12) , the technology of production of new capital (7), the implementability conditions of the workers (13) in each period, the life-time implementability conditions of the capitalists (14), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (15), and the bounds on capital tax rates (16), given the initial conditions on capital, government bonds and after-tax interest rate on those bonds.
While the numerical computation incorporates conditions (15) and bounds (16), for the analytical analysis we assume that n 2,t is optimally set to zero and that the upper and lower bounds on tax rates do not bind.
3 Then the Lagrangian for the government's problem is written as: 3 Conesa and Domínguez (2013) already consider the case where the same agent provides the two forms of labor.
where µ t , φ t , λ 1,t and λ 2 denote the multipliers on (12), (7), (13), and (14). The resulting rst-order conditions for all periods t ≥ 1 can be found in the Appendix. At steady state, these optimality conditions can be summarized in 
Combining the last three with the competitive equilibrium conditions (3), (8) and (10), we obtain the following optimal steady state taxes: 
Then we nd that the Ramsey tax plan is characterized by a zero corporate tax at steady state.
As investment is not tax deductible, a non-zero corporate tax generates a permanent intertemporal distortion and it is optimal to eliminate such a distortion. This is satised independently of the Pareto weights and, therefore, holds true from the point of view of all agents. This is the result of
Judd (1985) extended to the presence of management time.
The Ramsey tax plan does not prescribe a zero dividend tax at steady state. As investment is fully and immediately tax deductible, a constant dividend tax generates no intertemporal distortions but an intra-period distortion and may be set at a non-zero level. This is as in Conesa and Domínguez (2013). However, here, the optimal dividend tax rate does not coincide in general with the optimal labor tax rate. This results from the separation between the two types of labor.
In a representative agent model, the agent that supplies labor to rms is the same as the one that invests time in their business. This does not need to be the case, however, in our two-type agent model. Moreover, the policymaker may not value each type equally. Consequently, optimal dividend and labor tax rates do not need to coincide at steady state.
To further characterize the optimal steady-state taxes, we consider utility functions of the form:
where σ i and χ i are the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption and labor respectively and θ i the relative weight of leisure in the utility function.
4 For this form of utility functions (17), the optimal steady-state tax rates can be written as
,
. 4 Note that e 1,t = 0 and n 1,t > 0, while e 2,t > 0 and n 2,t = 0. For the numerical analysis, we allow for n 2,t ≥ 0.
Therefore, while the Ramsey corporate tax rate is zero at steady state, the Ramsey dividend tax rate is not. Moreover, the Ramsey dividend tax does not need to coincide with the Ramsey labor tax at steady state. In fact, combining the above equations, optimal steady-state dividend taxes can be solved as a function of the optimal labor taxes as follows:
which, for log utility functions for consumption and the same preference parameter values across agents, become
with c 2,ss c 1,
Then, even when preference parameters of both agents are the same, optimal steady-state dividend and labor tax rates dier as long as λ 2 λ 1,ss
only when the ratio of the distortionary cost of taxation among the agents λ 2 λ 1,ss coincides with the ratio of their Pareto weights 1−γ γ , then long-run optimal dividend and labor tax rates are equal, i.e. and then long-run dividend and labor taxes are identical. However, such precise value for the Pareto weight will depend on the specic parameters and initial conditions.
From the above ndings, it is clear that optimal steady-state dividend and labor tax rates depend on the preference parameters of all agents (σ 1 , σ 2 , χ 1 and χ 2 ), the life-time wealth of all agents (which directly aects λ 1,ss and λ 2 ) and the point of view of the policymaker (captured by the Pareto weights γ and 1 − γ). These features bring in inequality, in terms of preferences and wealth, and politics into the determinants of the optimal redistributive taxation.
For utility functions that are log in consumption and with the same parameters across agents, 
Ie,ss(xss,e 2,ss ) /Ix,ss(xss,e 2,ss ) f n (k ss , n 1,ss ) .
From the above, and ceteris paribus, an increase in the Pareto weight γ leads to a higher relative hours worked by the capitalists, i.e. e 2,ss n 1,ss ↑ . If, in absolute terms, workers consume more and work less hours, how is that higher consumption achieved? The budget constraint of a worker is
Then, a higher consumption requires that either labor tax rates go down and/or the capital stock goes up, that is τ n ss ↓ and/or k ss ↑. Looking at the optimal steady-state tax rates, and holding λ 1,ss and λ 2 constant, a more pro-worker policymaker increases dividend taxes and lowers labor taxes. However, the multipliers λ 1,ss and λ 2 cannot be held constant as they are endogenous and a government may want to lower λ 2 in order to increase the capital stock at steady state. Therefore, as the overall eect is unclear and depends on the responses of dierent endogenous variables, the next Section resorts to a numerical analysis of the Ramsey allocation and taxes.
Quantitative Exercise
In this Section we provide a numerical assessment of the optimal redistributive capital and labor taxes presented in the previous Section.
We consider the following specic forms. For the utility functions, we assume (17), with e 1,t = 0 and n 1,t > 0, and e 2,t > 0 and n 2,t ≥ 0. Note that capitalists are allowed to supply raw labor, and therefore the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (15) are included in the Ramsey problem. We consider a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
with A > 0, and α ∈ (0, 1), and a general investment function
with B > 0, and µ ∈ (0, 1) . Note that I(x t , e 2,t ) = Bx to output ratio of 1.65 in the corporate sector, which is equivalent to an aggregate capital to GDP ratio of 3. We later conduct sensitivity analysis to the above parameters.
For those parameter values, we assume that the economy starts o at an initial steady state with a government policy characterized by a government spending to output ratio equal to 19 per cent, a labor tax rate of 31.6 per cent, a dividend tax rate of 29.1 per cent and a corporate tax 5 Aguiar and Bils (2015) nd that the ratio of high-income to low-income consumption varies between 2.5 and 3.0. Our own calculations yield similar numbers for c2,ss c1,ss , given our denition of capitalists and workers. rate of 35 per cent. We assume then that our Ramsey tax reform takes place at that initial steady state. The results of this numerical exercise are reported below.
First, the theoretical ndings of the previous Section are conrmed. We nd that the optimal levels of the steady-state labor and dividend tax rates depend on the Pareto weights of the policymaker. Moreover, we also nd how the Pareto weights aect the Ramsey allocation in the long-run. This is illustrated in the following table:
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
In Table 3 , we nd that, for all γ, capitalists consume more and work less than workers at the steady state Ramsey allocation. As the Pareto weight on workers γ increases, the relative 
Then the capitalists' possibility of supplying raw labor as workers limits the extent of the redistribution towards workers. Given that capitalists consume more and work less than workers, it is clear that they enjoy a higher steady state utility than workers. In terms of overall welfare, Figure   2 depicts the ratio U 2 U 1 at the initial steady state and as implied by the Ramsey tax reform (taking into account the transition) for dierent values of the Pareto weight on workers γ.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
At the initial steady state, the welfare of a capitalist is 2.36 times that of a worker. This is equivalent to the capitalist enjoying a permanent consumption gain relative to workers of 160 per cent in each period. As the Pareto weight γ increases, our tax reform presents a decreasing
ratio. This ratio reaches a minimum value of 1.17 as γ becomes close to one. For that, and in consumption equivalent terms, a capitalist would be consuming 16 per cent more than a worker
permanently. Figure 2 also shows that, for Pareto weights γ ∈ (0.26, 0.30), the Ramsey tax reform
Pareto improves all workers and capitalists.
As the Pareto weight on workers γ increases, Table 3 also shows that the capital to output ratio at steady state increases. In our economy, the government's optimality condition for capital can be written as
at steady state. The term I x,ss implies that the capital to output ratio depends not only on parameters but also on endogenous variables and can be then aected by the Pareto weight γ. Table 3 shows that, in the long run, Ramsey corporate taxes are zero independent of the Pareto weights. Long-run Ramsey labor taxes are positive and can be large for γ < 0.29, while they are negative and provide a subsidy to workers for γ ≥ 0.29. As the Pareto weight on workers γ increases, long-run Ramsey labor tax rates decrease. This eect is monotone throughout all γ, albeit smaller for γ ≥ 0.485. Long-run Ramsey dividend taxes are negative for γ ≤ 0.11, while they are positive and can be quite large for γ > 0.11. The changes in γ have however a non-monotone eect on long-run dividend tax rates. As the Pareto weight on workers increases, the long-run dividend tax rates rst increase for γ ∈ (0, 0.485) , but then slightly decrease for γ ∈ (0.485, 1) .
For a policymaker with a very low Pareto weight on workers such as γ = 0.01, the optimal long-run policy sets labor tax rates as high as 90 per cent and dividend tax rates as low as −67 per cent. As the policymaker becomes more pro-worker, optimal steady-state labor taxes decrease and dividend taxes increase. For this calibration, optimal steady-state dividend and labor tax rates coincide in value at 14 per cent for a Pareto weight of γ = 0.19. For Pareto weights consistent with Pareto-improving reforms γ ∈ (0.26, 0.30), we nd that labor taxes are roughly eliminated while dividend taxes are increased to 36 per cent at steady state.
6 For a policymaker that values workers and capitalists equally with γ = 0.5, the long-run optimal policy prescribes a 14 per cent subsidy to workers and a 69 per cent dividend tax to capitalists. For that and higher Pareto weights, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (20) on the raw labor supply by capitalists bind at steady state. Using those conditions together with the rst-order conditions on the labor supply of workers (3) and on the eort supply of capitalists (8), we obtain
This shows that, once the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (20) bind, dividend and labor tax rates are tied together, limiting long-run redistribution. Consistent with that, for γ ∈ (0.485, 1) , we nd that, as the Pareto weight on workers increases, long-run optimal taxes change only minimally with slight decreases in both labor and dividend tax rates. Figure 3 shows the Ramsey tax rates during the transition. The Ramsey government chooses to use corporate taxes for redistribution during the transition but not at steady state. As the Pareto weight on workers γ increases, the number of periods for which corporate income is taxed at maximal rates increases. Except for very low γ, optimal dividend and labor tax rates converge from above to the steady state levels. The eect of the Pareto weight γ on the dividend and labor tax rates during the transition is in line with the one reported for the steady state. For γ ≥ 0.5, Table 3 includes a column that illustrates a Pareto-improving reform that yields a steady-state consumption ratio c2,ss c1,ss identical to the consumption ratio in the initial steady state. and increases the relative worked hours e 2,ss e 1,ss
, capitalists now consume and generally work substantially more than workers. Optimal labor (dividend) tax rates are substantially higher (lower). Identical steady-state levels of dividend and labor tax rates happen for γ = 0.40 approximately at 14 per cent. A Pareto-improving reform occurs now for γ = 0.54 and, interestingly, the policy prescription is similar to that of our benchmark with labor tax rates reduced to 2 per cent and dividend tax rates increased to 37 per cent. 
Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section, we conduct several numerical exercises to explore how sensitive our results are to our assumed parameter values and to the assumption that workers cannot save. Additionally, we also extend the model to incorporate intangible capital and evaluate its tax implications.
[Insert Tables 5.A We rst consider the possibility of workers having access to savings in terms of government bonds. Table 5 .A. reports the steady-state Ramsey allocation and taxes. While, as before, capitalists consume more and work less than workers, the gap between them is slightly smaller. In terms of long-run policy, the ability to save by workers does not aect much the optimal level of corporate, dividend and labor income tax rates.
Through our sensitivity analysis, we nd that while it is generally satised that the Pareto weight γ aects the long-run levels of dividend and labor taxes, the specic optimal levels depend on some parameter values. In particular, we nd that the share of capital on income does aect substantially the optimal level of long-run dividend and labor tax rates. Table 5 .B. shows that for a capital share of α = 0.30, optimal long-run dividend (labor) tax rates are substantially lower (higher) than in our benchmark. Now labor tax rates are not subsidized even when γ approaches unity. Tables 5.C to 5 .G and Table 6 show that changes in σ for all population, G, β, δ and ρ have a small eect on both long-run optimal taxes and allocation. Tables 7.A and 7 .B summarize the long-run optimal taxes prescribed by a Pareto-improving reform and by a policymaker that values workers and capitalists equally for dierent parameter values. There we see that the optimal long-run policy is remarkably similar to the one found in our benchmark calibration. As shown in Figure 4 , there are some small changes in the relative consumption gain by the capitalist. A lower capital share and a less elastic labor supply by the capitalists lead to higher relative consumption gains for the capitalists, while a more elastic labor supply by the capitalists, higher risk aversion coecient and higher capital depreciation lead to lower relative consumption gains.
Intangible Capital Stock
In this Section, we extend the model to incorporate intangibles in the capital stock. More specifically, we consider that k t now includes both tangible and intangible forms of capital, and that now capitalists also require intangible investment x u,t to produce new capital with the technology I (x m,t , x u,t , e 2,t ) . Intangible investment reduces corporate prots
and aects feasibility
Moreover, intangible investment makes corporate taxes distortionary as they aect the portfolio choice of investment by the capitalist. In the decentralized competitive equilibrium, this distortion is captured by the following optimality condition
For this new model, we setup the Ramsey problem and solve it numerically. We assume the following investment function:
and set ρ x = 0.001 and ρ u = −0.5. That is, the investment function is close to Cobb-Douglas between tangible resources x m,t and a composite of intangible resources and eort, and displays complementarity between intangible resources x u,t and managerial eort e 2,t . We calibrate C to target the hours worked by capitalists e 2,ss = 0.33. Other parameter values and targets are as in the benchmark except for the capital to output ratio, which is now equal to kss f (kss,nss) = 2.73 and the depreciation rate δ = 0.08 to take account of the intangible capital stock. Table 8 and Figure 5 illustrate the numerical ndings. The long-run Ramsey allocation is similar to our benchmark. The long-run Ramsey dividend and labor tax rates are higher than the benchmark. The main dierence between these results and those with the benchmark model and calibration is that, with intangibles, corporate income is not taxed at maximal rates during the transition. Figure 5 shows that corporate income is optimally taxed very lightly and, for most Pareto weights, corporate income is subsidized in some periods during the transition.
Conclusions
In this paper we have examined capital taxes and redistribution in a model with management time and investment deductibility. With full and immediate expensing of investment, we nd that the optimal redistributive features of capital taxes change dramatically. Optimal dividend taxes depend on preference parameters, life-time wealth and the point of view of the policymaker. This is not only relevant for dividend taxes. The current US corporate tax reform includes an immediate expensing provision for all depreciable assets (except structures) for at least 5 7 McGrattan and Prescott (2005) estimate an intangible capital stock of 1.083 of the corporate output and that intangibles depreciate at a higher rate than tangibles, at 10 per cent.
years. Ours results show the importance of this provision. Immediate expensing of investment eliminates the intertemporal distortions of constant capital taxes and connects capital taxes to time management choices. Then, at steady state, capital taxes do not need to be zero for eciency purposes and their optimal level critically depends on the redistributive motives of the policymaker.
Our ndings may help explain why capital taxes are dierent in dierent countries as well as why they change with government turnover.
[ 
Rearranging, the above conditions can be summarized in
The solution to the above problem is the Ramsey allocation. The Ramsey tax plan that decentralizes that allocation can be obtained from the equilibrium conditions (3), (9) and (10). Note: The calibration yields the parameters θ = 3.36, µ = 0.45, B = 5.14 and the initial allocation Note: The calibration yields the parameters θ = 9.90, µ = 0.54, B = 4.56 and the initial allocation 14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 Note: The calibration yields the parameters θ = 7.13, µ = 0.51, B = 6.78 and the initial allocation 0.90 0.37 0.12 0.02 −0.01 −0.09 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 Note: The calibration yields the parameters θ = 9.24, µ = 0.48, B = 7.93 and the initial allocation 0.90 0.37 0.12 0.01 −0.01 −0.09 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 Note: The calibration yields the parameters θ = 9.16, µ = 0.55, B = 6.18 and the initial allocation Note: The calibration yields the parameters θ = 9.16, µ = 0.27, B = 8.12 and the initial allocation −0.12 −0.13 −0.13 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 
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